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The Corporate Mortgage Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and the
New York Solution
New York's Uniform Commercial Code went into effect on
September 27, 1964.1 The decade of study and debate preceding its
adoption was accompanied by the most extensive hearings and
consequent recommendations undertaken in any state so far,2 and,
as in most states adopting the Code, New York's version includes
many important variations from the 1958 and 1962 Official Texts.
Among other deviations in Article 9,3 New York has added to
section 9-302(1) two provisions4 which are intended to cope with
the long-term financing problems of both existing and future corporate indentures.5 These problems have been severely neglected
by Article 9, which was designed primarily to solve the complexities
of short-term lending.6
A corporate mortgage has been defined as "an indenture intended
to convey property, real and personal, tangible and intangible, to a
trustee for bondholders, as security for the bonds issued and to
be issued thereunder" by a corporation.7 This financing device,
1. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 553 (effective Sept. 27, 1964).
2. See the 1954-56 N.Y. I.Aw REVISION CoMM'N REP.; Report of the Law Revision
Commission to the Legislature Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code, N.Y. I..EG.
Doc. No. 65(A) (1956). See generally Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 2 AMERICAN BUSINESS L.J. 137, 143-48 (1964); Braucher, The 1956
Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 VILL. L. REv. 3 (1956); Panel Discussion,
Report of the New York Law Revision Commission-Areas of Agreement and Disagreement, Bus. Law., Nov. 1956, p. 49.
3. The changes in New York's version of Article 9 are explained in Penney &
Hogan, Commercial Law, 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 273 (1963); Penney, New York Revisits
the Code-Some Variations in the New York Enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 62 CoLuM. L. REv. 992 (1962); cf. Auerbach & Goldston, Variations in the Ohio
Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 22 (1962); 5 VILL. L.
REV. 465 (1960).
4. N.Y. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-302(l)(b), (k). The changes in § 9-302(1)
were responsive to the 1962 Report and Recommendation of the Permanent Editorial
Board, S. INT. No. 2135, Pr. No. 4110; A. INT. No. 3531, Pr. No. 5829. The 1962
Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code will hereinafter be cited U.C.C., and
the New York version will hereinafter be cited N.Y. U.C.C.
5. See notes 148-57 infra and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., l COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
CoMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3.13, 13.01, at 1342 n.2 (1963). The late Professor Karl Llewellyn
recognized these problems in the early stages of the drafting of the Code, Llewellyn,
Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 I.Aw & CONTEMP. PROB. 687, 691 (1948), but
bis limited warning seems to have gone unheeded. Mr. Peter Coogan, a member of
the Permanent Editorial Board's Subcommittee No. 3 to consider Article 9, has
written many excellent articles in various law reviews during the past decade concerning Article 9 and its application. These articles, together with contributions from
other prominent authors on secured transactions, have been collected and updated
in two volumes, l & 2 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, op. cit. supra (1963-64). References
to the articles included in the book will hereinafter be cited as l or 2 COOGAN.
7. McCLELLAND & FisHER, CORPORATE MORTGAGE BOND lssuES 11 (1937). New York
defines a corporate mortgage as "a mortgage creating a lien upon real and personal
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utilized by many large corporate organizations, has grown to be of
paramount importance in the field of corporate financing, 8 and
the lack of attention given by the Code to the long-term debts of
corporations has raised serious questions of filing procedures. Discussion of the novel treatment accorded by New York to the problem of perfecting security interests in corporate mortgages will
constitute the main part of this comment. That state's treatment
deserves scrutiny both because of the magnitude of effort expended
by New York on the study of the Code before its adoption and
because of its traditional role as a commercial and financial leader.
The New York statutory provisions relevant to the problems of
perfecting the indenture will be reviewed and an attempt will be
made to explain their practical effect on mortgages executed subsequent to the Code. The problems associated with the transition to
the Code from the conglomerate pre-Code New York lien law
for indentures existing at the effective date of the Code will be
discussed, and methods concerning the alleviation of these difficulties suggested. However, before dealing with the various ramifications of the New York version, it may prove helpful to explore the
broad background of the relationship generally between Article 9
and the corporate mortgage.
I.

GENERAL EFFECT OF THE

u.c.c. ON Posr-CODE

CORPORATE INDENTURES

A. Filing
The Code will increase the utility of the corporate mortgage as a
financing tool for both the borrower and the secured party.9 But
filing requirements present several problems to the corporate pracproperty, exceuted by a corporation . . . •" N.Y. LIEN LA.w § 190. It is clear that
the use of the term and the applicability of the aforementioned statutes are not
limited to railroad or utility corporations in New York, but apply to the mortgage of
a manufacturing company as well. In re F. &: D. Co., 256 Fed. 73 (2d Cir. 1919). The
terms corporate mortgage, corporate indenture, combined mortgage, and package
mortgage, will be used synonymously in this comment, and no reference will be
made to an unsecured indenture.
8. For the historical development of the corporate indenture, see McCLELLAND
& FisHER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1-5; Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76
HARv. L R.Ev. 1333-69 (1963); Draper, A Historical Introduction to the Corporate
Mortgage, 2 ROCKY MT. L. R.Ev. 71 (1930); Drinker, Concerning Modern Corporate
Mortgages, 74 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 360 (1926). The entire spectrum of the corporate in•
denture field has been concisely treated in KENNEDY, CoRFORATE TRUST .Ai>MINIS·
TRATION (1961).
9. Article 9 is intended to replace prior law dealing with various forms of chattel
security including mortgages, conditional sales, trust receipts, factors liens, etc. For
general approaches and explanations of Article 9, see 1 CoOGAN §§ 1.01-4.10; Kripke
& Felsenfeld, Secured Transactions-A Practical Approach to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 168 (1962); Kripke, The Modernization
of Concepts Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 15 Bus. LAW, 645
(1960).
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titioner working under the Official Text, which offers no special
filing rules for this form of transaction.10
Since the indenture involves real estate as well as other property,
the mortgagor must record it in the appropriate real property
records.11 For all personal property subject to the mortgage, filing
is required in the central filing system of the state12 and, in certain
states, in the local records also if the mortgagor has a place of business in one county only.18 Pre-Code filing requirements for corporate
mortgages frequently appeared to be singularly stringent. Unless
special filing provisions had been made for these indentures,14 the
security interest in personal property embodied in the indenture
became subject to the local chattel mortgage filing statutes. Most
such statutes required, in addition to filing wherever the property
was located, periodic refiling.15 The seeming stringency of these
statutes was illusory, however, since the chattel mortgage refiling
requirements were largely ignored by the mortgagor, whose inaction
was acquiesced in by the trustee. 16 Several states alleviated the burden
either by not requiring the refiling of chattel mortgages or by giving a
special filing exemption to railroad and public utility corporations,17
10. The law in most states prior to the Code also lacked special provisions for the
filing of corporate indentures. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 511.01 (1947); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 44M60 (1952). But cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2317 (1953). See generally Comment,
Uniform Commerdal Code Article 9 Filing Procedures for Railroad, Utility, and Other
Corporate Debtors, 62 MICH. L. REv. 865 (1964). It should be remembered that an
important goal of Article 9 is to do away with the many artificial distinctions of
pre-Code law relating to liens on personal property, many of which were based only
on the form that the transaction had taken. Comment to U.C.C. § 9-101. While there
is no disagreement with the basic soundness of such an ideal, this does not mean
that the corporate indenture does not merit a special filing provision on the basis
of form alone or intrinsic difference, such as New York has provided.
11. The Code exempts real estate transactions from its coverage specifically in
U.C.C. § 9-104(j), and by implication in § 9-102(1), (2), except insofar as rights and
duties pertaining to personal property or fixtures are involved, as in combined mortgages. Filing problems will be of concern to the corporate mortgagor as well as to the
indenture trustee and bondholders because the agreement typically imposes on the
mortgagor a duty to comply with filing requirements to avoid default.
12. u.c.c. § 9-401(1).
I!. U.C.C. § 9-40l(l)(c) (optional paragraph). The official text offers three alternatives for subsection (1). If the third is selected in the adopting state, the double
filing for all personal property except fixtures is required if the debtor " ••• has a
place of business in only one county of this state" or " ••• if the debtor has no place
of business in this state, but resides in the state, also in the office of •.• .the county
in which he resides." Ibid. For a list of the options adopted by the several
code states, together with other filing rules in those states, see 1 COOGAN § 6.13. Some
states have forsaken central filing in favor of exclusively local filing, a very question•
able alternative. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-9-401(1) (1962).
14. See the statutes cited note 10 supra.
15. E.g., lowA CODE § 556-12 (1950).
16. Letter from Frank H. Heiss of the New York Bar to Frank R. Kennedy, Nov.
18, 1963, on file in the offices of the Michigan Law Review. See Comment, supra note
10, at 869-70.
17. E.g., IowA CoDE § 476.15 (1949); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 45:382-.384 (1951). The
financing of public utilities, railroads, and other carriers and the filing of the security
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to all corporations,18 or to all mortgagors of real and personal
property.19 Among states adopting the Code, some of these exemptions have been retained,20 and some are of doubtful status,21 but
many Code states have not given any type of exemption to corporate
mortgages. In these latter jurisdictions, the burden placed on corporate mortgagors by the relatively short duration of the perfected
security interest recognized by some chattel mortgage filing statutes
will be partially lessened by the Code's section 9-403, requiring a
continuation statement to be filed only once every five years. No
additional periodic filing is required if the original post-Code indenture filing perfects a security interest in after-acquired property.22
The filing requirements of the Code relative to the perfection of
security interests in purely personal property included in the indenture generally impose no insuperable burden on the corporate
mortgagor.
On the other hand, the Code's treatment of filing requirements
for fixtures, items which will almost certainly be included in the
indenture, has created considerable confusion.23 Lack of clarity in
the fixture section of the Code will ultimately necessitate multiple
filing and recording in Code states not utilizing a special exemption
for corporate indentures. While the provisions for fixture filing
seem clear on the surface, certain deficiencies of draftsmanship have
generated many problems for those charged with the responsibility
of filing in the appropriate records. Section 9-40l(l)(b) provides
simply for the proper place to file to perfect a security interest:
"when the collateral is goods which at the time the security interest
interests on the assets thereof present many specialized problems. See generally Adkins
&: Billyou, Developments in Commercial Aircraft Equipment Financing, IS Bus. LAw.
199 (1958); Adkins &: Billyou, Current Developments in Railroad Equipment Financing,
12 Bus. I.Aw. 207 (1957); Comment, supra note 10; Comment, Mobile Equipment
Financing-Federal Perfection of Carrier Liens, 67 YALE L.J. 1024 (1958).
18. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2317 (1953); HAWAII REv. LAws §§ 196-2, 343-52
(Supp. 1963); N.Y. LIEN I.Aw § 231.
19. Ohio Acts, 1959, § 1319.03, at 9.
20. E.g., N.Y. u.c.c. § 9-302(I)(k); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1309.2l(C)(2) (Page Supp.
1964). Also, some states have added provisions, usually to § 9-302(3)(b), which are
meant to exempt various classes of mortgages from filing, but the clarity and effectiveness of these additions are still in considerable doubt. Comment, supra note 10, at 872
n.36.
21. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 94-301(10) (1958); MONT. REv. CODE .ANN. § 72-211
(Supp. 1963); OKLA. STAT. tit. 66, §§ 14, 15 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 67, § 523 (1930).
See Comment, supra note IO, at 872.
22. u.c.c. § 9-204(3).
23. See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 8; Hollander, Imperfections in Perfection of Ohio
Fixture Liens, 14 W. R.Es. L. REv. 683 (1963); Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 44 (1964); Shanker, A Further Critique of the
Fixture Section of the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 BosroN COLI.EGE INDUSI'RIAL
&: COMMERCIAL L. REv. 61 (1964); Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for Purchase Money Collateral-A Proposed Solution to the Fixture Problem Under Section
9-JlJ of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 YALE L.J. 788 (1964).
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attaches are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a
mortgage on the real estate concerned would be filed or recorded."
Subsection 9-313(1) is the root of the fixture filing problem because it carries over much of a state's pre-Code law concerning
whether and when various items become fixtures.24 Subsequent
subsections set out specific priority rules, but their effectiveness
depends upon first ascertaining the category of property into which
the item in question belongs. The difficulty in relying on pre-Code
fixture law for classification guidance is that much prior fixture law
is on the precipice of anarchy.25 The New York fixture rule, accepted by the majority of states, has long recognized and defined
the fixture category and has generally granted priority to the fixturesecured party over the holder of a prior real estate security interest.26
In the states following New York, the transition to the Code will
create less confusion regarding fixtures than in other states since
the category of "fixtures" has an accepted meaning and applicability.27 However, a minority of states have refused to recognize a
specific class of property called "fixtures." Some have determined
priority purportedly by reference to whether the installation has
become part of realty or remained personal property,28 but the
actual determination of priority has been judged by the equities
of the particular situation.29 A strong influence on these minority
states has been the nebulous "material injury to the freehold" test,
24. U.C.C. § 9-313(1): "The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated
into a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work and
the like and no security interest in them exists under this Article unless the structure
remains personal property under applicable law. The law of this state other than
this Act determines whether and when other goods become fixtures. The Act does
not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to the
law applicable to real estate." See generally 2 CooGAN § 17.09; Kripke, supra note 23,
at 47; Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1391-1400.
25. 2 COOGAN §§ 16.06, 17.09. For pre-Code articles vainly attempting to construct
a coherent system from the morass, see Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning the
Law of Fixtures, 7 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1907); Friedman, The Scope of Mortgage
Liens on Fixtures and Personal Property in New York, 7 FORDHAM L. REv. 331 (1938);
Kratovil, Fixtures and the Real Estate Mortgagee, 97 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 180 (1948); Niles,
The Rationale of the Law of Fixtures, 11 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 560 (1934).
26. E.g., Madfes v. Beverly Dev. Corp., 251 N.Y. 12, 166 N.E. 787 (1929); Tifft v.
Horton, 53 N.Y. 377 (1873). But cf. Roche v. Thurber, 246 App. Div. 850, 285 N.Y.
Supp. 82 (1936), affd mem., 272 N.Y. 582, 4 N.E.2d 814 (1936). See also 2 COOGAN
§ 17.03, at 1789 n.13; Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1365 n.75. There is an exception to
this general rule in the case of construction mortgages. See e.g., Grupp v. Margolis,
153 Cal. App. 2d 500, 504, 314 P.2d 820, 823 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Gilmore, supra
at 1367-69. It would appear that the U.C.C. draftsmen contemplated only the majority
rule when drafting § 9-313(1). Gilmore, supra at 1395.
27. See id. at 1394.
28. E.g., Clary v. Owen, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 522 (1860). See 2 COOGAN § 17.03;
Gilmore supra note 8, at 1355-58. Some of the uncertainty in Massachusetts was dispelled by Mass. Acts 8: Resolves 1943, ch. 52 § I (repealed by the U.C.C.). Professor
Gilmore has concluded that the difference between the majority and minority views
was more of form than substance. Gilmore, supra at 1357.
29. For an illustration, see Carpenter v. Walker, 140 Mass. 416, 5 N.E. 160 (1886).
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which generally classifies property in a priority dispute by whether
its removal would substantially lessen the value of the remaining
real estate. Some jurisdictions have conceived other unfortunate
doctrines.so Within a single jurisdiction, the same installation occasionally has been held to be in several different property categories,81
and buildings have even been classified as personal property.82
The basic remedy for default provided by the Code is removability of fixtures; 33 many states, however, have previously termed a
removable fixture "a contradiction in words," 34 thus defeating the
Code's remedial cornerstone because of the section 9-313(1) loophole. The priority rules provided in subsections 9-313(2), (3), and
(4) are weighted on the side of the fixture financier, but in light
of the pre-Code ideological morass concerning whether and when
an item is a fixture, it is uncertain to what extent this priority will
be effective.s5 It will often be difficult for the lawyer in a Code jurisdiction to be able to ascertain, with any appreciable degree of certainty, into which category of property a given item may later be
held to have been included.36 Therefore, in order to be safe where
the possibility of a classification dispute exists, it is necessary for the
practitioner to file both in the fixture side of the real estate records
office and in the personal property filing system.37 If many transactions involving fixtures are expected, multiple filing may become
inconvenient, but inconvenience is preferable to a later invalidation
of the security interest.ss This filing burden will be encountered
only infrequently when the transaction is a corporate mortgage, how30. For example, the infamous Pennsylvania "industrial plant" doctrine and the
New Jersey "institutional" doctrine. See Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1!160; Leary,
Financing New Machinery for Mortgaged Pennsylvania Industrial Plants, 4 Vn.L.
L. REv. 498 (1959); Robinson, McGough & Scheinholtz, The Effect of the Uniform
Commercial Code on the Pennsylvania Industrial Plant Doctrine, 16 U. Prrr. L. REv.
89 (1955). Gilmore maintains that the Code has abolished these aberrations. Gilmore,
supra at 1!197-98. But see 2 COOGAN § 16.06(1), at 1712 n.68; Kripke, supra note 2!1,
at 63 n.65.
31. Compare Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279 (1867), with Lorain Steel
Co. v. Norfolk &: B. St. Ry., 187 Mass. 500, 73 N.E. 646 (1905). Compare Farrar v.
Stackpole, 6 Me. 154 (1829), with Carpenter v. Walker, 140 Mass. 416, 5 N.E. 160
(1886). See also 2 COOGAN § 17.09.
32. Thompson Yards, Inc. v. Bunde, 50 N.D. 408, 196 N.W. 312 (1923); Royal Store
Fixture Co. v. Patten, 18!1 Pa. Super. 249, 1!10 A.2d 271 (1957).
33. u.c.c. § 9-31!1(5).
34. See Teaff v. Hewitt, I Ohio St. 511 (185!1). See 2 COOGAN § 16.06(1).
35. See Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1395.
36. Id. at 1392-93.
37. See generally 2 CooGAN §§ 16.04-.05, 16.09, 17.07; Kripke, supra note 23, at 61.
Suggestions for the improvement of the Code's treatment are found in 2 COOGAN
§§ 17.08-.09; and the authorities cited in note 2!1 supra. Massachusetts has provided
that present or future fixtures included in a mortgage of real property need not be
filed in the fixture records, but that a real estate recording will perfect the security
interest therein. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 106, § 9-409(3) (1963).
38. For an analysis of the treatment accorded and to be accorded fixture interests
in bankruptcy, see 2 CooGAN § 17.06.
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ever, since the multiple filing and recording need be made only at
the time the original indenture is executed, at whatever interval
supplemental mortgages39 are to be executed (if at all) and at the
time continuation statements40 are due.

B. Security in Fixed Assets
Security interests in equipment and machinery have long been
recognized as valid in the corporate indenture, both as to items
originally included in the mortgage and after-acquired property of
this nature.41 Under the U.C.C., a timely filing of the indenture will
subordinate all subsequent liens on these items.42 However, security
interests in after-acquired equipment and machinery, although
generally safe, can be subjected to a purchase-money security interest in that equipment.43 The indenture trustee may not learn
of subsequent purchase-money liens,44 but the problem presented is
relatively small because it is highly unlikely that the total amount of
purchase-money security in equipment outstanding at any given time
will be appreciably great. The turnover of these larger items is usually
slow.45
C. Security in Current Assets
The Code's greatest potential for change lies in the area of longterm security interests in current assets. Pre-Code law was generally
harsh on the bondholders under an indenture which included an
after-acquired property clause46 that was intended to apply to inventory, accounts receivable, or other intangibles, i.e., a "floating
lien." 41 Draftsmen long ago gave up the attempt to include conll9. See notes lll6-47 infra and accompanying text.
40. U.C.C. § 9-403. See notes 125-35 infra and accompanying text.
41. See Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1349-50, 1354.
42. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (the "first-to-file" rule).
43. U.C.C. § 9-312(4). See generally Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1385-88. A closelyrelated area is the purchase-money priority in fixtures. See id. at 1388-1400.
44. 1 COOGAN § 13.06(4), at 1379 n.104.
45. Ibid.
46. For pre-Code treatments of the after-acquired property clause in the corporate
indenture, see generally Blair, The Allocation of After-Acquired Mortgaged Property
Among Rival Claimants, 40 HARv. L. REv. 222 (1926); Cohen &: Gerber, The AfterAcquired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 635 (1939); Foley &: Pogue, After•
Acquired Property Under Conflicting Corporate Mortgage Indentures, 13 MINN. L.
REv. 81 (1929); Israels &: Kramer, The Significance of the Income Clause in a Corporate Mortgage, 30 CoLuM. L. REv. 488 (1930).
47. See, e.g., Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925); Lee v. State Bank &: Trust
Co., 38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1930); Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1926); Zartman
v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907); COOGAN §§ 3.03(2), 3.07, 3.08;
Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1334-35. Compare Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y.
570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894), with Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N.Y. 519, 24 N.E. 8ll (1890). See
generally Burman, Practical A~pects of Inventory and Receivables Finandng, 13 LAw
&: CoNTEMP. PROB. 555 (1948); Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Finandng,
62 HARV. L. REv. 588 (1949). For a comparison of the English and American floating
liens, see 1 COOGAN § 13.08. Some of the English legal literature on the subject has
been compiled in Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1334 n.2.
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tinuing liens on such assets in the corporate mortgage,48 for any of
a number of factors could invalidate all or part of the indenture.
The most notable of these factors was the "dominion rule" of
Benedict v. Ratner.49 In that case, Mr. Justice Brandeis, purporting
to apply New York law, 50 held that an attempted assignment of
accounts receivable in an indenture was void as to other creditors
where the secured party had not kept sufficient control over the
collateral to demonstrate his interest therein to other creditors. 51
The typical indenture trustee has neither the power nor the
resources to maintain the policing system called for by Benedict.52
Even if such a system were feasible under pre-Code law, the security
in the assets would provide an uncertain priority at best. The buyer
of the merchandise inventory in the ordinary course of business
would defeat the prior mortgage. Other current assets or the proceeds accruing from their sale would likely become "commingled"
and render the collateral "unidentifiable." 53 Further, an established
judicial doctrine has frequently subordinated the indenture trustee's
claim against current assets, especially income, to the claims of cur. rent creditors,54 and it can be said there has been a long-standing
judicial distaste for the "floating lien."
The New York rule was that a clause purporting to include any
after-acquired property under the mortgage lien was invalid as to
other creditors unless some further step had been taken to perfect
it.55 The practice in New York then became to include the dubious
48. See 1 COOGAN § 13.06(3); Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1349.
49. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
50. However, the only New York case on point at that time, Stackhouse v. Holden,
66 App. Div. 423, 427, 73 N.Y. Supp. 203, 205 (1901) (mem.), was directly contra.
51. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925). Cf. Zinman, Dominion and the Factor's
Lien-Does Section 45 of the New York Personal Property Law Abrogate the "Dominion Rule"?, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 59, 63 (1961). A recent application of the Benedict
doctrine is found in Matter of Cut Rate Furniture Co., 163 F. Supp. 360 (N.D.N.Y.
1958). For a discussion of the relation between the dominion rule and N.Y. PERS.
PROP. LAw § 45, see Zinman, supra. The difference between accounts receivable
financing and factoring is pointed out in Moore, Factoring-A Unique and Important
Form of Financing and Service, 14 Bus. LAw. 703, 724-25 (1959).
52. See 1 COOGAN § 13.06(3).
53. See id. § 13.06(4).
54. See id. § 13.06(3); Israels &: Kramer, supra note 46. Another potential problem
for the indenture draftsman is the federal tax lien. See 1 COOGAN § lll.07(4): " ••• the
indenture draftsman must at least be aware that the danger of the tax collector
making a successful attack on a security transaction may be somewhat increased when
that transaction involves a 'floating lien' on current assets." See also United States
v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958); Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the
Federal Government-The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63
YALE L.J. 905 (1954); MacLachlan, Improving the Law of Federal Liens and Priorities,
1 BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL &: COMMERCIAL L REv. 73 (1959); Plumb, Federal Tax
Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAX L. REv. 247 (1958).
55. Zartman v. First Nat'! Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907); Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894); McCu:u.AND &s FISHER, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 284-85, 336-38; Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in New York, 20
CoLUM, L. REv. 519 (1920); Zinman, supra note 51, at 67, n.50. For a public utility
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clause in the indenture and to execute subsequent supplemental
mortgages to complete the perfection. Noncompliance with this
procedure resulted in the partial56 or total57 invalidation of the
mortgage in bankruptcy, even as to assets on which the lien had
been perfected.58 Most other jurisdictions, however, have allowed
the indenture trustee considerably more leeway in including afteracquired property under the mortgage lien.59
The draftsmen of the Code have attempted to alter radically the
status of the floating lien.60 Benedict's dominion rule is expressly
abrogated. 61 The Code deals with the problem of the "gap creditor" 62
by generally trying to eliminate the instances which would allow
the gap to be created. 63 Section 9-108 purports to circumvent a
bankruptcy preference problem in respect to after-acquired collateral. That section states that, under certain conditions, subcorporation the rule was otherwise. Pintsch Compressing Co. v. Buffalo Gas Co., 280
Fed. 830 (2d Cir. 1922); In re Adamant Plaster Co., 137 Fed. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1905);
McCLELLAND &: FISHER, supra at 337. See generally Fagan, Sales and Security Law, 26
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 72, 81·95 (1951); Hart, Commercial Law, 35 N.Y.UL. REv. 1477
(1960).
56. E.g., Zartman v. First Nat'! Bank, supra note 55.
57. E.g., Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925); Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d
Cir. 1926); Arbury v. Kocher, 18 F.2d 588 (W.D.N.Y. 1927).
58. Ibid.
59. McCLELLAND &: FISHER, CoRPORATE MORTGAGE BOND Issm:s 340-42 (1937). For
an old judicial criticism of the New York rule, see Lister v. Simpson, 38 N.J. Eq. 438,
441 (Ch. 1884), aff'd, 39 N.J. Eq. 595 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1885).
60. See generally l COOGAN §§ 7.01-.12, 11.01-.09, 13.06; Kripke, Current Assets
Financing as a Source of Long-Term Capital, 36 MINN. L. REv. 506 (1952); Sutkowski,
Inventory Financing Under the U.C.C., the Secured Creditor's Dream?, 68 CoM. L.J.
95 (1963). For analyses and discussions on the treatment Article 9 has been and will
be accorded in bankruptcy proceedings, see generally Friedman, The Bankruptcy
Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Property Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. PA.
L. REv. 194 (1959); Kennedy, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Insolvency-Article 9, 67 CoM. L.J. 113 (1962); Levy, Effect of The Uniform Commercial
Code Upon Bankruptcy Law and Procedure, 60 CoM. L.J. 9 (1955); Raphael, The
Status of the Unsecured Creditor in the Modem Law of Secured Transactions, 2
BOSTON CoLLEGE INDUSTRIAL &: COMMERCIAL L. REv. 303 (1961); Schwartz, The Effect
of the Uniform Commercial Code on Secured Financing Transactions and Bankruptcy,
38 REI;. J. 124 (1964); Note, Some Possible Areas of Conflict Between the Illinois
Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 418.
61. U.C.C. § 9-205 and comment. The extension of the Benedict doctrine in Lee
v. State Bank &: Trust Co., 54 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1931), had previously been nullified in
New York by the 1943 amendment to § 45 of its personal property law. See Zinman,
supra note 51, at 84. It has been argued that the original passage of § 45 in 1911
nullified the dominion rule, Stone, supra note 55, at 532, but the opposite conclusion
is more persuasive. See Zinman, supra at 92.
62. A gap creditor is one who extends credit during the period between execution
and perfection of the security interest. In New York, the protection of general
creditors was extended by Karst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073 (1893), which
held that a chattel mortgage filing after the expiration of a reasonable time gave no
protection against creditors existing at the time of execution. The adoption of the
Code in New York abolishes this rule. See 1 CooGAN § 3.03.
63. U.C.C. §§ 9-201, -301. See Hawkland, The Impact of the Commercial Code on
the Doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 67 COM. L.J. 359 (1962).
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sequently acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for
new value and not for an antecedent debt, 64 but to what extent this
attempt will be effectuated by the courts is uncertain. 65 The problems of "commingling" and "unidentifiable proceeds" have been
provided for, 66 albeit with uncertain results. 67 To the extent the
relevant Code provisions do not conflict with federal bankruptcy
statutes or policy, it will be possible for indenture draftsmen to
create a valid continuing lien on all of the debtor's assets without
requiring control over them to be exercised by the secured party.
However, it is highly unlikely that long-term financing with
current assets will be widely utilized. Though many of the problems
have apparently been solved, considerations of the quality of the
security interests created will tend to keep financiers within the
traditional pattern of extended lending. For example, the security
obtained by an indenture on inventory will not be equal either to
that achieved by the lender who exercises control over the inventory68 or that provided by assets with more permanent attributes.69
Where little control over the debtor is exercised, there is the risk
that he will have dealt with his inventory and receivables in such a
manner that these assets will not be in existence when bankruptcy
occurs.70 The priority of the buyer in due course71 and the purchasemoney security interest72 are continued under the U.C.C., and, even
in view of the Code's attempt to afford more protection to the
secured party in bankruptcy, the extent to which the draftsmen have
succeeded is uncertain. 78 These factors should tend to induce hesitance on the part of the lender desiring to simplify his usual methods
of financing current assets by executing a long-term mortgage on the
current assets with a broad after-acquired property clause. 74 Even
if he decides such a system is feasible, however, the added problem
of the debtor's liquidity may cause many financiers to forego the
64. U.C.C. § 9-108. Acquisition of collateral under a contract of purchase pursuant
to the security agreement within a reasonable -time after new value is given is also
characterized by this section as not for an antecedent debt, but this saving provision
is not likely to be important in connection with corporate mortgages. For a discus.don
as to whether an indenture trustee will prevail over the bankruptcy trustee as to
inventory acquired within four months of bankruptcy, compare I CooGAN § l!l.07,
with id. § 10.03.
65. See id. § 10.03(7)(c).
66. U.C.C. §§ 9-315, -306 respectively.
67. See 1 COOGAN § 13.06(4).
68. Ibid. See also Moore, supra note 51; Silverman, Factoring as a Financing Device,
27 HARv. Bus. REv. 594 (1949); Zinman, supra note 51.
69. See 1 COOGAN § 13.06(4).
70. Ibid. But one claiming a purchase-money priority in the inventory will be
required to give notice to the indenture trustee. U.C.C. § 9-312(3).
71. u.c.c. § 9-307.
72. U.C.C. § 9-312(3). See 1 CoocAN §§ 11.01-.09; Gilmore, The Purchase Money
Priority, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1333, 1377-85 (1963).
73. See the authorities cited note 60 supra.
74. See 1 CoOGAN § 13.06(4); Gilmore, supra note 72, at 1336.
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scheme. If the borrower has encumbered all of his assets, he will
have no collateral on which to finance a short-term loan to ease him
over a period when he needs ready cash to avoid impending trouble.
This resulting loss in liquidity, unless carefully provided for in an
emergency future advance clause from the indenture trustee, 7is may
increase the debtor's chances of winding up in bankruptcy. The
diminution or destruction of the value of the business entity as a
going concern caused by the bankruptcy proceedings would tend to
inflict an unnecessarily large loss on all creditors.76 Many lenders
have already recognized that imposing this economic straitjacket
on the debtor by greedily encumbering all available assets will be
detrimental to themselves as well as the borrower and have, for the
most part, continued to use the other operative financing methods
which were utilized prior to the Code.77
II.

THE NEW

YoRK

TREATMENT OF CORPORATE

INDENTURE FILING

Prior to the Code, the filing of corporate mortgages in New York
was governed by section 231 of the lien law.78 That section provided
that a mortgage of real and personal property, executed by a corporation, need be recorded only in the real estate records of the
counties in which the mortgaged real estate was located.79 Originally
limited to railroad and utility mortgagors,80 the liberal filing requirements were extended to all domestic corporations,81 and later, in
1960, to foreign companies as well. 82 The pressure for this liberalization of filing requirements was generated by the burden of the
chattel mortgage refiling section,83 which originally required a
yearly refiling and then, by amendment, a filing every three years. 84
Section 231 reduced substantially this repetitive and time-consuming
75. This type of clause would be contrary to the usual practice. See 1 COOGAN
ll!.06(3), at 1375 n.92.
76. The Code has provided a set of alternative foreclosure remedies for the holder
of a mortgage on both real and personal property, U.C.C. § 9-501(4). See 1 COOGAN
§ 8.07(5). But it is highly unlikely that these remedies will be utilized, as foreclosure
is economically impractical for corporate indentures, the questions relating to which
will ordinarily be settled in bankruptcy proceedings. Rather than a significant interest
in the corporate assets, the bondholder actually receives a strong bargaining position
when trouble occurs. Id. § 13.10.
77. See Malcolm & Funk, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts Experience Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Bus. I.Aw. 525, 539-41 (1961).
78. N.Y. LmN I.Aw § 231.
79. See generally Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64
COLUM. L. R.Ev. 44 (1964).
80. N.Y. Laws 1868, ch. 779.
81. N.Y. Laws 1895, ch. 529. See note IO supra.
82. N.Y. Laws 1960, ch. 1004, § 12; N.Y. Laws 1960, ch. 1004, § 6. See Kripke, supra
note 79, at 77.
83. N.Y. Laws 1915, ch. 608, § I; Kripke, supra note 79, at 76.
84. N.Y. Laws 1943, ch. 451, § I.
§
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task for counsel and greatly lessened the indenture trustee's fears of
subsequent liability for failure to file. 85 While comforting to the
trustee and to counsel, the effect of this section was to create an
apparently insuperable search problem for a lender seeking to
ascertain prior liens on a chattel ostensibly owned free and clear by
the corporation, 86 for the lien could often have been filed in any
one of a number of county real estate records. This burden was
largely theoretical, however, because lenders to corporate borrowers
are a special class of financiers likely to be aware of and to avoid pitfalls of overextension of credit. 87 Immediately prior to the adoption
of the Code in New York, the primary benefit conferred by section
231 on corporate mortgagors was the exemption from chattel mortgage refiling requirements.
When the U.C.C. was adopted in New York, section 231 was
renumbered section 190,88 amended, 89 and specifically excepted from
the general repeal of article ten of the lien law by the U.C.C.90 as
part of a comprehensive statutory scheme to regulate the filing of
long-term corporate indentures. Section 190-1 of the lien law now
provides that all mortgages of real and personal property executed
by a corporation subsequent to the adoption of the Code will be
recorded as before; and any security interests in personal property
or fixtures contained therein will further be required to be perfected
by the single additional filing of a financing statement in the department of state,91 which is the central filing office for all security
interests in personal property. Section 190-2, which seems to apply
to mortgages executed both prior and subsequent to the effective
date of the Code,92 requires that supplemental mortgages executed
pursuant to the original mortgage must also comply with the dual
filing and recording procedure set out for future mortgages in the
first subsection. In the Code itself, New York has added two provisions to section 9-302(1) which are meant to control the filing of
both existing and future combined mortgages. In the case of indentures recorded prior to the date the Code took effect, section
9-302(l)(h) stipulates that no financing statement need be filed, but
that such mortgage shall continue to be governed by 231, the pre85. These fears stemmed from two old cases, Miles v. Vivian, 79 Fed. 848 (2d
Cir. 1897); Green v. Title Guar. 8e Trust Co., 223 App. Div. 12, 227 N.Y. Supp. 252,
afj'd mem., 248 N.Y. 627, 162 N.E. 552 (1928). See generally Kripke, supra note 79, at
76; Posner, The Trustee and the Trust Indenture, 46 YALE L.J. 737 (1937).
86. Kripke, supra note 79, at 76.
87. 2 COOGAN § 16.05. These lenders would have realized ordinarily that it would
be necessary to check the real property records in the county where the debtor owned
real estate or to ask the debtor what prior debt he had incurred and where to find it.
88. N.Y. Laws 1963, ch. 1003, § 45 (McKinney 1963).
89. Ibid.
90. N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-105.
91. N.Y. LIEN LAw § 190-1.
92. See text accompanying notes 136-39 infra.

April 1965]

Corporate Mortgages

1057

Code section of the lien law. Section 9-302(l)(k.) looks to future
combined mortgages and provides that a financing statement for
the personal property and fixtures covered shall be filed in the
Department of State only and will be governed by post-Code section
190. In the Code repealer provisions, New York has attempted to
bring the outstanding mortgages into the dual filing system within
one year of the effective date of the Code, sections 9-302(l)(h) and
231 notwithstanding.98 Other Code provisions of interest to parties
to a corporate mortgage are 9-403(2) and 9-403(3), under which
any filed security interest will lapse on its stated maturity date or
at the end of five years, whichever is earlier, unless a continuation
statement is filed within six months before or sixty days after the
maturity date.
Filing continuation statements will tend to be slightly more
burdensome than under section 231, which demanded no further
recording or filing. 94 One writer has already proposed an addition
to the Code to alleviate this relatively minor problem.95 The net
intended effect of these provisions is to retain the convenience of
ease of filing and refiling long-term corporate indentures, but to
impose some additional requirements, and to incorporate these
security interests into the central filing system for security interests
in personal property. In summary, the differences in filing between
the pre-Code law and the Code in New York are essentially twofold:
First, all original and supplemental corporate mortgages will now
have to be recorded in the applicable real estate records and
filed in the central filing system, whereas previously only the former
was required; second, a continuation statement will henceforth have
to be filed every five years during the duration of the indenture,
whereas pre-Code law required no further filing or recording except
for supplementals.
Although the author of the New York Practice Commentary to
93. See notes 124•35 infra and accompanying text.
94. Although not explicitly stated in the statutes, the assumption bas uniformly
been made that § 9-403 applies to indentures on file in the Department of State.
1 COOGAN § 13.04(5); Kripke, supra note 79, at 78 n.112. Section 9-403(2) refers to
"a filed financing statement," which would surely seem to include a filed corporate
indenture. Also, § I0-102(2)(b) explicitly requires continuation statements to be
filed to extend the perfection of existing indentures, but the effectiveness of this
provision is doubtful. See notes 124-33 infra and accompanying text. But since
the indentures will be recorded in accordance with N.Y. LIEN LAw § 190 and the
only filing required is in the department of state office, it may conceivably be argued
that this evidences a desire to liberalize the filing requirements for the corporate
indenture and, as § 190 nowhere states that continuation statements shall be
demanded, the courts should accommodate this desire. This argument is refuted,
however, both by the language of § 9-302(l)(k), which in terms requires the filing
of a financing statement in this case and by § 190-1, which requires "filing in
accordance with part four of article nine."
95. Kripke, supra note 79, at 78 n.ll2.
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Article 996 suggests that the main reason for the promulgation of this
system, based primarily on the retention of the liberal requirements
embodied in section 190 of the lien law, is to accommodate the
desire of counsel to avoid the problems associated with fixture
filing, 97 a better procedure would have been to resurrect a central
filing system for railroads and utilities, without relieving "run-ofthe-mill" corporations from the problems faced by other borrowers
and lenders generally.98 Fixture filing will present many difficulties to the practitioner dealing with corporate indentures in
other Code states, as has been discussed above.99 The problems would
have been considerably less in New York had no separate filing
provisions for corporate indentures been made, because there the
law of fixtures, for all its perplexities and the relative inconveniences
it engenders,100 is reasonably settled on a fairly rational basis. 101
Although avoidance of fixture filing problems was doubtless a strong
motivating factor in retaining the essence of the statute, it would
also appear102 that the New York legislators were conscientiously
trying to solve the broader question posed by the requirements of
long-term finance ignored by the Code. Until it is generally recognized, as it has been in New York, that the corporate mortgage is
96. Mr. Homer Kripke, also a member of the Permanent Editorial Board's Subcommittee No. 3 To Consider Article 9.
97. Kripke, supra note 79, at 77.
98. Ibid. Cf. the Transmitting Utility Place of Filing Act, recently approved
by the American Bar Association. Section 2 (a) states: "If filing is required under the
Uniform Commercial Code, the proper place to file in order to perfect a security
interest in personal property or fixtur~ of a transmitting utility is in the office of
(the Secretary of State)." Cf. also the addition to U.C.C. § 9-302 prepared by the
Association of American Railroads:
"(5) Except as provided in this subsection, the filing provisions of this Article
do not apply to a security interest in property of any description or any interest
therein created by a mortgage made by a corporation which is a railroad or a
public utility . • . but the mortgage shall be recorded and filed in accordance
with the following requirements:
"(a) The mortgage shall be recorded in (the appropriate office of each county
in this state) in which any real estate described in the mortgage is situated; and
"(b) the mortgage shall be filed in the office of the (Secretary of State or
appropriate state official) if the mortgage includes any rolling stock, movable
equipment or machinery or any other personal property. . . .
"To the extent that any mortgage heretofore executed has been filed or
recorded as provided herein, it need not be re-filed or re-recorded thereunder,
and nothing hereunder shall be deemed to impair the lien or effect of any
mortgage heretofore executed which has been recorded or filed in accordance
with the laws of this state applicable thereto prior to the effective date of this
Act."
See also Billyou, A Proposal for a Federal Railroad Mortgage Recording Statute, 26
ICC PRAcrITIONERS J. 424 (1959).
99. See notes 23-40 supra and accompanying text.
100. Even in New York, borderline cases would require the multiple filing and
recording discussed in the text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
101. See the cases and authorities cited note 26 supra.
102. No information as to the relevant legislative debates and hearings has been
discovered. Cf. Breuer, Legislative Intent and Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation in New York, 51 L LIBRARY J. 2 (1958).
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fundamentally different from the conditional sale and other shortterm security devices and should be treated differently, the Code's
goal of conceptual unity for all transactions creating security interests
cannot be effectively achieved. The Code draftsmen, while eliminating many of the difficulties of the pre-Code law, have, in this instance,
refused to acknowledge important conceptual and practical differences.
The statutory scheme that has been enacted in New York in an
attempt to fill the void left by the Code creates two partial exceptions
to the Code's goal of one uniform filing system for all security
interests in personal property. The debtor with a place of business
in one county only will not be required to file locally if his assets
are encumbered by a combined mortgage103 although if the mortgage covered only personal property, such a debtor would have to
file in the county where he was doing business.104 This exception
dims considerably in importance when it is recalled that the new
system requires central filing. 105 It will not be an oppressive burden
on the searcher looking for a corporate debt to utilize the central
records at the state capital instead of relying exclusively on the local
records. 106 Further, the requirement of local filing for debtors having
a place of business in only one county is of dubious value in the first
instance,107 although it has many supporters. 108 The other filing
exception in New York is the absence of any requirement of a
record of secured corporate debt in the local fixture records. This
exception is also relatively unimportant, not only for the reason
previously noted, but also because the indenture itself will be
located in the same office in which fixture filings are to be made.109
Mr. Coogan has suggested an Ohio recording and filing system,
now repealed, as a possibly desirable alternative to the present New
York system. 110 The Ohio statute was unique in that it applied to
any combined mortgage of both real and personal property regard103. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(k); N.Y. LIEN LAw § 190-1.
104. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-40l(l)(c).
105. See the statutes cited note 103 supra.
106. Searching services will provide a rapid and efficient way of discovering
any security for earlier debts if the practitioner finds it inconvenient to search the
central records personally. Even if the local filing exception for corporate
mortgagors did not exist, complete reliance on local records is fraught with traps
for the unwary. See, e.g., In the Matter of J &: J Baking Co., 18 App. Div. 2d 691,
236 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962) (pre-Code local filing).
107. See 1 COOGAN § 6.11(3).
108. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, 19 Bus. LAw. 5, 27 (1963) (remarks of Mr.
Coogan).
109. Fixture filing is to be done "in the office where a mortgage on the real
estate ••• would be ••• recorded," N.Y. U.C.C. § 9;40l(l)(b), and N.Y. LIEN LAw
§ 190-1 requires that all corporate indentures be recorded "in each county where
such real property is located." It would be a small burden for the fixture searcher
to check both sets of records in the same office.
110. 1 CoOGAN § 3.13.
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less of the nature or status of the mortgagor. 111 Mr. Coogan acknowledges, however, that the entire area of long-term finance under the
Code requires restudy.112 It would appear that extending the benefits
of the liberal filing requirements of section 190 to any mortgagor
of both real and personal property, whether or not incorporated,
would be somewhat more democratic, but also unnecessary, inasmuch
as the combined mortgage on both kinds of property is utilized principally by large corporations with good credit ratings. Mr. Coogan's
suggestion seems to run counter to the prevalent sentiment that favors
a statute considerably more restrictive in scope than that adopted in
New York. 113 Although the system promulgated by New York is a departure from the Official Text of the Code, and to that extent involves
a disregard of the Code's goal of uniformity among all states,m
these provisions attempt to solve a problem ignored by the Code.
They should be considered an appropriate addition to the Official
Text, rather than a radical departure therefrom.
Aside from the question of where to file, another problem incident to filing post-Code corporate mortgages in New York is that of
ascertaining what must be filed in order to perfect the security
interest. The Code now permits "notice filing" for most secured
transactions, whereas prior New York law allowed this type of filing
only for transactions in inventory. 115 The security agreement,116
the indenture itself, typically runs to many pages, but only a brief
"financing statement" need be filed, the requisites for which are enumerated in section 9-402.117 While the generality of description of
the collateral allowed in that section is highly beneficial to the
short-term lender financing goods with a rapid turnover, 118 it does
not serve the corporate mortgagor and its lender so well. If a very
broad description as permitted by section 9-402 is utilized in perfecting a corporate mortgage, a subsequent potential lender on
111. Ohio Acts, 1959, § 1319.03, at 9.
112. 1 COOGAN § 3.13.
113. See note 98 supra. On the problem of the filing of corporate indentures,
four positions have been taken: (1) The Official Text of the Code admits of no
exception for corporate debt; (2) Many feel that an exception should be made
for only the most far-flung of the corporate mortgagors, i.e., the railroads and public
utilities; (3) New York excepts all corporate mortgages; (4) Ohio previously excepted
any mortgage which included both real and personal property. Michigan •has chosen
the second alternative. Unless the Permanent Editorial Board or a legislature can
effectively classify corporations by size and distribution of its property, a seemingly
hopeless task, the New York solution seems the most desirable of the four alterna•
tives. Geographical distribution of property is certainly not restricted to railroads
and public utilities. The aforementioned fixture filing questions will be posed for
all large debtors.
114-. U.C.C. § l-102(2)(c).
115. 1 COOGAN § 3.06(1). See generally id. §§ 6.01-.15.
116. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(h) broadly defines a security agreement as "an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest."
117. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-402.
118. l COOGAN § 13.04(1).
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collateral not intended to be covered in the earlier indenture may
shy away because of the possibility that the collateral may be later
found to have been included.119 The subsequent lender will have no
legal means of obtaining further information about the existing corporate mortgage120 and, even if such information is given to him, he
may still refuse to take the chance. 121 Therefore, the indenture draftsman should be careful not to over- or underdescribe the collateral in
the indenture; 122 and the entire indenture, or at least the granting
clauses, should be filed as the financing statement.123 In sum, the filing
scheme for corporate indentures enacted by New York, while deficient in several transitional particulars discussed below, is a constructive response to a need pertaining to an important category of secured
transactions largely ignored by the Code.

III.

PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION IN NEW YORK

To perfect the security interest in personal property and fixtures,
corporate mortgages recorded in New York prior to the effective
date of the Code had to be recorded in accordance with section 231
of the lien law. That section required merely that the mortgages
be recorded in the real estate records where the real property
covered in the mortgage was located,12i with a like procedure for
supplementals.1215 Thereafter, no further filing or recording was
demanded of the borrower. New Jork has attempted to provide
a statutory system to aid the transition to the Code whereby the
original validity of the indenture on record will be continued and,
119. Id. § 13.04(2).
120. U.C.C. § 9-208 gives the debtor the right to demand further information
from the secured party, but no such procedure has been provided for one not a
party to the original transaction. See 1 COOGAN § 6.08(5).
121, Id. § 13.04(2). Mr. Coogan also points out that the lender may be able to
obtain a purchase-money priority, but that this expedient is inconvenient and otherwise undesirable. Id. at 1357 n.45.
122. Id. § 13.04(1); cf. McCLELLAND 8e FISHER, CORPORATE MORTGAGE BOND ISSUES
243-56 (1937). The customary drafting method is broadly to include collateral and
thereafter specifically to exclude items. Id. at 244 n.28. If, on the other hand, the
draftsman wishes to be certain that no further liens on any type of collateral will
be perfected on any of the mortgagor's assets, he can include all the assets in the
filing statement, even though these are not covered by the indenture. The debtor
has to sign the financing statement. U.C.C. § 9-402(1). For additional safeguards, see
KENNEDY, CORPORATE TRusr .ADMINISTRATION 61-62 (1961).
123. 1 CoocAN §§ 3.13, 13.04. Another aspect of New York law benefiting corporate
mortgagors is the abrogation of the rule requiring consent of the corporation's
shareholders prior to the execution of a mortgage on any or all of the corporation's
assets, unless otherwise specified in the articles of incorporation. N.Y. Bus. Co!U'. I.Aw
§§ 202(a)(7), 911. Cf. N.Y. STOCK Co!U'. I.Aw § 16. It should be noted that the New
York practitioner will also have to consider the possible effect of New York's new
Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR). N.Y. Civ. PRAc. I.Aw (effective Sept. I, 1963).
See 2 COOGAN § 21.03.
124. N.Y. LIEN LAW § 231.
125. Ibid.

1062

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 6!:1045

in addition, whereby the security interests in personal property
represented by the indenture will be transferred to the central
filing system within one year from the date on which the Code
took effect. Section 9-302(1 )(h) states that no financing statement
need be filed to perfect the security interest in personal property
in an existing indenture. Section 10-102(2) initially provides that
prior transactions creating security interests under prior laws will
continue to be governed by those prior laws. Section 10-101 makes
explicit the fact that the U.C.C. applies only to transactions entered
into subsequent to the date it takes effect. 126 These and other provisions, while seemingly clear as to the transition procedure, leave open
several questions.
A. Continuation Statements
New York has appended several subsections to 10-102 which, in
addition to continuing the validity of prior security interests under
prior law repealed or modified by the U.C.C.,12 7 are clearly intended
to force the holders of all outstanding security interests in person~
property to file a continuation statement in the central filing
system. 128 If such a statement is not filed, the security interest will
lapse twelve months after the effective date of the Code or at
the expiration date set forth in the instrument, whichever is
earlier. 129 Because of a seeming error of draftsmanship, it is doubtful
whether the purpose of incorporating existing security interests
into the central filing system has been effectuated. Section 10-102(2)
provides that "the perfection of a security interest . . . (b) which
was perfected when this Act takes effect by a filing, refiling or recording under a law repealed by_this Act and requiring no further filing,
refiling or recording to continue its perfection, continues until and
will lapse twelve months after the date this Act takes effect ..." 130
unless a continuation statement is filed in the interim.
An existing corporate indenture, duly perfected pursuant to old
section 231, would seem to fit this description inasmuch as it is a
security interest which took effect by a recording prior to the U.C.C.
and which requires no further filing or recording. But the indenture
did not become perfected by a law repealed by the Code. Its
perfection stemmed from section 231 of the lien law, which was
specifically exempted from repeal. 131 The draftsmen apparently
126. Cf. N.Y. U.C.C._§ 9-102.
127. N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102(2).
128. N.Y. U.C.C. § IO·l02(2)(a)-(c).
129. Ibid.
130. N.Y. U.C.C. § I0-102(2)(b). Cf. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-10-102 (Supp.
1964); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382-A: 9-401 (1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:10-101
(Supp. 1964).
l:H, N-Y, lJ,C,C, § 10-105. New York practice makes mandatory specific, aa
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assumed that the amending and renumbering of 231 had "repealed"
it sufficiently to bring corporate mortgages that were outstanding
when the Code took effect within the terms of section 10-102(2)(b)
(quoted above), but the express repealer provisions of section 10-105
seem to negate that construction. The draftsmen added the words
"or modified" after the word "repealed" in the initial part of
10-102(2) in 1964,182 and the omission of the same phrase in subsections (a), (b), and (c) has apparently impaired the goal of incorporation.138 Therefore, notice of these outstanding mortgages will
not necessarily be found in the central filing system after September
27, 1965, and it seems unlikely that the existing indentures will lapse
on that date if no continuation statement has been filed. 134
However, the filing of the continuation statement in this situation offers relatively little inconvenience to the practitioner185 and
may spare him much subsequent difficulty. In a case arising after
September 27, 1965, where the continuation statement has not been
filed within the prescribed period, a bankruptcy court, zealous in
protecting general creditors, may conceivably void the mortgage as
having lapsed on that date by the rationale that the draftsmen of
section 10-102(2) succeeded in spite of themselves. This could be
done only by finding that section 231 had been "repealed" sufficiently
for the purposes intended by the draftsmen, and that the holders of
security interests who did not comply by filing the continuation
statement had consequently lost their security. In light of applicable
language, this holding seems unlikely, but in the interest of safety
it is advisable to file the continuation statement to eliminate the
possibility of the security interest lapsing.

B. After-Acquired Property
The language of new section 190-2 of the lien law seems to
indicate that it applies to outstanding corporate indentures; it
opposed to general, repeal. Cf. U.C.C. § 10-103. For a short discussion of the
problems involved in repeal by implication, see 47 IOWA L. R.Ev. 496 (1962).
1!12. N.Y. LA.ws ch. 476 § 21 (McKinney 1964).
13!1. All that would be needed to rectify this oversight would be the insertion
of the words "or modified" after the word "repealed" in each of these subsections.
134. Cf. Comment, Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Filing Procedures for
Railroad, Utility, and Other Corporate Debtors-Some Suggestions, 62 MICH. L.
R.Ev. 865, 876-78 (1964).
135. At this point, it should be noted that § 10-102(2) requires filing in accordance
with § 9-401(1) and not § 9-302(1), which may mean that the simplistic filing procedures of N.Y. LIEN LA.w §§ 190, 231 are arguably not applicable in this situation.
If this construction is sound (it is opposed to common sense), multiple filing of the
continuation statement therefore will be required if the indenture includes fixtures,
N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-40l{l)(b), or if the debtor has a place of business in only one county,
N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-40l(l)(c). Requirements for the contents of these special continuation
statements are also enumerated in § 10-102(2), as is a reference_ to § 9-403(3), which
requires an additional continuation statement to be filed every five years.
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refers to "any such original mortgage" which "provides or provided"
for the inclusion of after-acquired property.186 That section further
stipulates that subsequent supplemental mortgages picking up such
after-acquired property will have to be recorded where the original
was recorded, filed in the department of state, and also recorded
in any county in which the after-acquired property is located. 187
This provision, however, with its apparent reference to both existing
and future mortgages, is somewhat incongruous in light of the Code
subsections 9-302(l)(h) and (k). Subsection (k), which applies only
to future mortgages, states that they shall be governed by section
190. But subsection (h), dealing with mortgages recorded prior to
the Code, refers only to 231 and does not mention 190. The question
of whether section 190-2 was intended to apply to both existing
and future indentures or only to the latter will become important
in a situation where a supplemental executed subsequent to the
Code under a mortgage executed prior to the Code has been recorded
in accordance with section 231 but has not met the more stringent
requirements of section 190-2. Except insofar as the security in the
collateral secured by the supplemental can be salvaged by section
9-401(2) (the provision purporting to save a partial security interest
in the collateral for the party who has filed erroneously) it seems
likely that the supplemental will not effectuate the lien on the afteracquired property.
Bankruptcy courts can become quite strict on the question of
filing, and there seems to be no way to defeat the proposition that
the supplemental is to be covered by section 190-2. By its terms,
the only supplementals meant to be governed by section 9-302(l)(h),
and, by reference, section 231, are those "heretofore" recorded,188
a category into which this hypothetical supplemental cannot logically
be construed to fit. The mere absence of reference to section 190 in
subsection (h) does not necessarily support the implication that supplementals executed subsequent to the Code are to be regulated
only by section 231, the section to which express reference is made,
especially in light of the language of section 9-302(l)(k), whose
mention of "a supplemental mortgage ... hereafter recorded," can
easily be construed to be applicable. Further, the language of section
190-2 indicates that its provisions were intended_ to govern this situation.139
'
It might be argued that a supplemental is not covered by the
Code because it is not a "transaction" within the meaning of section
10-101; therefore, it would be in violation of section 10-101 to allow
section 190-2, a provision intended to augment the Code, to predom136.
137.
138.
139.

N.Y. LIEN LAw § 190-2. (Emphasis added.)
Ibid.
N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(h).
See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
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inate. This argument, however, will probably not be accepted
because a supplemental is virtually certain to be a transaction under
the broad definition in section 9-102(l)(a).140 In any event, section
190 is not a section of the Code and section 10-101 is inapplicable as
to it. Therefore, supplemental mortgages to a pre-Code mortgage
executed subsequent to the adoption of the Code should be filed in
the manner specified by section 190-2 to ensure their validity in the
event of the debtor's bankruptcy.
The preceding discussion of supplementals is relevant only if the
practitioner desires to continue utilizing that system of validation.
That practice prevailed in pre-Code New York; frequently an afteracquired property clause of dubious validity was inserted into the
indenture, and thereafter the lien on the property subsequently
obtained by the debtor was perfected with a supplemental mortgage,
usually executed at yearly intervals.141 The question now arises as to
what effect the Code will have on one of these possibly invalid afteracquired property clauses in a prior mortgage which, if it had been
executed under the aegis of the Code, would be valid. It is clear that
the mere passage of the U.C.C. will generally not affect the rights
and duties flowing from the terms of a pre-Code indenture. 142
Although section 10-102(2)(b), quoted earlier, evidences the desire of
the legislators to incorporate the outstanding mortgages into the central filing system, the filing of a continuation statement pursuant to
that section, whether or not it is necessary, will not serve to bring
the indenture itself under the substantive provisions of the Code,
but will merely prevent an early lapse of the security interest. 143 This
interpretation is reinforced by a subsequent subsection of 10-102
which, in another situation, provides that the prior security interest
in question "continues under" the Code.144 The apparently deliberate omission of this phrase in subsection (b) demonstrates that the
Code was not intended to extend blanket coverage to the pre-Code
transactions defined in that subsection. On the other hand, the language of section 10-102(2) does make possible an argument that the
parties are given an election as to the law under which their indenture is to be governed and could therefore validate the questionable
clause merely by expressing a desire to be ruled by the Code. U tilization of the word "may" 145 in the phrase pertaining to the enforce140. See also 1 COOGAN §§ 13.03(2), 13.03(3): "9-204(1) seems fairly clear in
recognizing that separable security interests arise as each new lot of collateral comes
under the indenture.''
141. Id. § 13.04 at 1362 n.53(2). Cf. N.Y. Laws 1954, ch. 754, § I.
142. See I COOGAN § 13.03(2).
143. N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102(2): " ••• [the] security interC!it ••• (b) ••• will lapse
• • • unless • • • a continuation statement is filed . • • .''
144. N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102(3)(a).
145. N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102(2): " ••• the rights, duties and interests flowing from
[prior secured transactions] • • • remain valid thereafter and may be terminated,
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ability of prior transactions, instead of the more definite "shall,"
created the question. However, it is unlikely that this construction
would be adopted by any court in view of the confusion that would inevitably result and the ease with which the subsection can be construed to be absolute rather than permissive.146 To bring the prior indenture under the terms of the Code, it is necessary to enter into a
transaction or an event as required by section I 0-101 ;147 the Code does
not automatically include it in its coverage.
The parties to an outstanding mortgage with an after-acquired
property clause when the Code took effect will, in all probability,
wish to bring the indenture within the Code's coverage. Besides the
obvious advantage of validating the after-acquired property clause,
the Code generally makes secured transactions easier, cheaper, and
more secure for all parties concerned.148 But there may be reason
for the secured party under a prior indenture to wish also to remain
within the coverage of pre-Code law. Many of the provisions of
Article 9 have yet to be tested in court, 149 and doubts have been
expressed as to the efficacy of some of the security interests created
by the Code,150 since, in several instances, a possible conflict with the
completed, consummated or enforced as required or permitted by any statute or
other law repealed or modified by this Act as though such repeal or modification had
not occurred ••••" (Emphasis added.)
146. 1 CooGAN §§ 13.02(2); 2 id. § 16.04(3). Another possible but rather far.
fetched argument could be made that § 10-102(3)(a) would suffice to bring the
indenture within the Code's coverage automatically. That subsection requires that
a security interest filed prior to the Code under a law repealed by the U.C.C. for
which the Code would require no filing "continues under" the U.C.C. The lawyer
attempting to obtain the Code's coverage for a pre-Code indenture for which no
filing has been made could argue that no financing statement need be filed for
indentures executed pursuant to § 9-302(l)(k) because such filing would be made
in acordance with § 190 of ,the lien law rather than the Code. Therefore, the
prior indenture is governed by the Code's provisions since no further Code filing
is required. This argument would appear to be fallacious for at least two reasons.
Any reasonable construction of § 9-302(l)(k) has to admit that that subsection,
standing alone, requires the filing of a financing statement; also, the law under
which the security interests of the indenture were perfected, old § 231 of the lien law
was not "repealed."
147. 2 COOGAN § 16.04(3). Cf. N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 9-102(l)(a), 9-204(1); 2 COOGAN §
16.04(4).
148. See, e.g., 1 id. §§ 1.01-4.10; K.ripke & Felsenfeld, Secured Transactions-A
Practical Approach to Article 9 of the Uniform Commerdal Code, 17 RUTGERS L. REY.
168 (1962); K.ripke, The Modernization of Concepts Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commerdal Code, 15 Bus. LAw. 645 (1960); Schnader, The Case for the Uniform
Commercial Code, 77 BANKING L.J. 633 (1960). For the viewpoint of the commercial
lender, see Stidham, Secured Loans Under the Uniform Commercial Code (Article
IX), 75 BANKING LJ. 475 (1958).
149. Pennsylvania has the longest experience under the Code, and her courts
have not yet been deluged by cases arising out of Article 9. See generally Goodwin,
Article 9, Uniform Commercial Code-Pennsylvania Decisions on Secured Transactions, Corporate Practice Commentator, Nov. 1961, p. 71; Kauffman, Section
9-401(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code as Interpreted by the Courts, 68 CoM.
L.J. 253 (1963).
150. See the authorities cited note 60 supra.
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Bankruptcy Act awaits the unwary. Also, where a choice exists, many
practitioners hesitate to abandon the familiar law under which they
have practiced to venture forth into the unknown ramifications of
this complex statute. 1151
If the parties prefer to rely on the virtues of Article 9, the best
method for obtaining the Code's coverage is to re-execute the original
indenture and go through a regrant of the collateral, both extant
and after-acquired.152 This procedure would certainly meet the aforementioned transaction requirement and would dispel any doubt as
to what collateral is governed by which law. However, the negotiation, expense, and inconvenience this method will usually entail will
prompt counsel to attempt to find an easier solution. The filing of
either a financing or a continuation statement alone which merely
refers to the existence of the prior indenture would not appear to be
an adequate transaction for the purposes of section 10-101 and would
therefore not suffice to bring the indenture under the Code.1153 On
the other hand, if a financing statement were filed containing a regrant of the after-acquired collateral, this action arguably would serve
to validate the inclusion of property thereafter acquired,154 but the
uncertainty inhering in this procedure will probably limit drastically
its wide utilization.11515
The New York practitioner wishing to have the best of both
statutory worlds, i.e., to have the original collateral governed by the
liberal pre-Code filing rules and also to have the after-acquired property clauses come under the provisions of Article 9, may possibly
accomplish this coup by fulfilling the continuation statement filing
requirement of section 10-102(2) and executing a supplemental mortgage pursuant to section 190-2, which picks up the property acquired
since the last supplemental and also contains a regrant of afteracquired property. The continuation statement would insure that
the prior mortgage would not lapse156 and would continue to be
governed by prior law. 157 Whether the subsequent supplemental
mortgage will be adequate to bring within the Code the afteracquired collateral will depend upon whether such supplemental is
determined to be a transaction.158 It would appear that a supplemen151. That Article 9 requires much new thought can be shown by the volume of
literature it has generated. See, e.g., the annotations periodically printed in the
Boston College Industrial b Commercial Law Review and the Article 9 bibliography
in 9 WAYNE L. REv. at 666-72 (1963). But cf. l COOGAN §§ 2.01-.07 where it is
argued that the changes are more of terminology than substance, and that the transition to the Code can be relatively painless.
152. l CooGAN § 13.03(2), at 1351 n.36.
153. N.Y. u.c.c. § 10-101. See l COOGAN § 13.03(2).
154. l CooGAN § 13.03(2).
155. Ibid.
156. N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102(2)(b).
157. See notes 142-51 supra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 140 and 147 supra.
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tal would not be adequate to bring the original under the U.C.c.,m
but section 9-204 makes explicit the proposition that either the inclusion of subsequent collateral or the making of a future advance
will create a separable security interest160 and will suffice to bring
that collateral or that advance within the substantive terms of Article
9.161 In this connection, subsection 190-2 and -3 of the lien law
could be argued apart from the above considerations in attempting
to convince a court that a subsequent supplemental mortgage containing a regrant of after-acquired property is all that is necessary to
perfect both the security interest in the actual property covered by
the supplemental and a lien on any other appropriate property there_after acquired by the debtor. The latter subsection stipulates that
after-acquired property clauses that were valid without filing or
recording prior to the Code will continue to enjoy the same validity,
indicating that the legislative intention was to give a broad effect to
these clauses.162 The former subsection by its terms covers the situation.
To summarize, where a previously invalid after-acquired property clause in an indenture existing at the effective date of the Code
is sought to be validated, the safest procedure for implementing this
goal is the re-execution of the indenture and a regrant of the collateral. If this method is not utilized, a supplemental containing a regrant of after-acquired property should be executed, recorded, and
filed pursuant to section 190 of the lien law. The mere filing of a
:financing or continuation statement which only refers to the existence of the prior indenture will be ineffective for this purpose, as
will be merely doing nothing in the belief that nothing further is
required.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Code will generally be beneficial to the holders of long-term
security interests in corporate assets. Indenture trustees' fears of the
uncertain conglomerate pre-Code law have been somewhat allayed
by provisions making the security interest more secure. It is now
theoretically possible in Code states to create a valid continuing lien
on any or all of the debtor's assets while no dominion over them need
be maintained by the secured party. However, an authoritative judi159. 1 COOGAN § 13.03(2).
160. See id. § 13.03(3).
161. Ibid.
162. It would appear that the main motivation behind the enactment of § 190-3
was to reassure the railroads and public utilities, somewhat unnecessarily, that the
after-acquired property clauses in their indentures, generally enforceable before the
Code without the further recording of supplementals, would retain their validity. A
possible interpretation of § 10-102(2)(c) would require the filing of a continuation
statement for the security in property under these clauses acquired subsequently
to the original indenture, but such a construction would be both linguistically
dubious and contrary to § 190-3.
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cial determination that the draftsmen of the Code have succeeded in
their aim is necessary before the lender will place complete reliance
in the more controversial sections of Article 9. Even with this assurance, it is uncertain whether financiers will radically depart from
their traditional lending procedures. One respect in which the Code
is unsatisfactory is that, by neglecting to provide suitable rules for
the filing of security in long-term debt, the Code imposes a large burden of multiple filing on the shoulders of corporate debtors. New
York has attempted to treat this problem ignored by the draftsmen
of Article 9. The New York statutory sections relating to this problem as a whole give a coherent and intelligent solution. It is recommended that those states ,considering adoption of the Code and other
Code states not having made similar provision should study carefully
the ramifications of the question together with the New York enactment. The goal of uniformity among the states is an important one,
but it would be realized in a more desirable manner if other states
were to follow New York's lead in this area rather than if all unreservedly accept the Code's lack of treatment. Other states should take
cognizance, however, of certain deficiencies in the New York system,
especially regarding the transition to the Code. More specifically, the
seemingly inadvertent omission in section 10-102(2)(b) which sheds
doubts on its effectiveness in requiring continuation statements
could have been prevented had the draftsmen thought the problem
through more completely in terms of corporate indentures. Other
progeny of insufficient drafting consideration include both the uncertainty in reference embodied in the dichotomy of sections 9-302
(l)(h) and 190 and the lack of a concrete procedure for handling
transitional problems. Such deficiencies are perhaps inevitable in the
course of extended statutory tinkering, but at least some needed
tinkering has taken place, and other states can profit both by New
York's gains and mistakes.
George C. Goggins

